Memo
from Stephen Endicott,
Professor of History,
York
University,
analyzing the documents obtained by the Olson family from CIA Director
William Colby in June 1975
Professor
of History, York University, Toronto,
Co-author
with Edward Hagerman of:
The
United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War
and Korea.
4
February 1999
Toronto, ON, Canada,
I
can see why the Olson family feel so dissatisfied with the official
verdict of suicide as the cause of his death. At the same time it seems
clear that Mr. Colby would not have given them the papers had he thought
there was anything contained in them that might make possible a challenge
and reversal of the official verdict. (One paragraph of the CIA report
on Mr. Olson's death is blanked out by a censor) Perhaps Colby didn’t
pay close attention, because there are certainly some disquieting matters
in the conduct and reported conversations of Frank Olson’s colleague,
Robert Lashbrook, and the New York allergist, Dr. Harold Abramson, in
the hours after Mr. Olson’s death.
Here
is a summary of the scenario as formed in my mind:
Frank
Olson, Ph.D, a biologist by profession, was a disturbed man in 1953.
He had been working in the Biological Laboratory of the Special Operations
Division, of the U. S. Army Chemical Corps (formerly known as the Chemical
Warfare Service) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, for about ten years without
any problem. According to his colleagues he had always been a popular,
extroverted person and his professional, scientific work was considered
to be outstanding. He was a branch chief and in October 1952 the confidence
which his superiors had in him was reflected in the fact that they promoted
him to be Acting Chief of the entire Special Operations Division.
After
six months, in March 1953, Olson reverted back to his former position
at his own request. It was also in March 1953 that he became mentally
and emotionally disturbed. According to his wife, Alice, he could no
longer sleep at nights, and she urged him to consult a psychiatrist.
The cause of his disturbance is not made clear in the documents at hand,
but it is said that he had begun to feel guilty about something. Was
it from overwork and worry caused by the burdens of heading up the whole
Division? It might have been, but by now he had been relieved of that
burden. Another answer is suggested by a colleague: “It is well
known,” wrote Dr. Howard Abramson after Olson's death, “that
it is an occupational hazard to mental stability to be doing the type
of work connected with his [Olson’s] duties. Guilt feelings are
well known to occur to a greater or less extent.” (Colby Pg. 38)
What
was the nature of Olson’s duties? Stripped of technical language
and put bluntly, they were to use his knowledge of biological and medical
science to perfect secret ways to kill or incapacitate other humans,
animals and plants.
The
Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick was the most secret of secret
places in the biological warfare program and only people with the highest
security clearance could work there or gain admission to its grounds.
Frank Olson counted himself in this number. It was the centre of covert
biological warfare and as such the record of its activities are deeply
buried. But it is known that the SOD was considered to be very effective,
receiving commendation on “the originality, imagination and aggressiveness
it has displayed in devising means and mechanisms for the covert dissemination
of bacteriological warfare agents.” (Our BW book, pg 70.) When
William Colby appeared before a Senate Committee in 1975 to explain
the Agency's involvement in biological warfare he remarked that from
the outset this activity “was characterized by extreme compartmentation”
[sic] and “a high degree of secrecy within CIA itself.”
Only
two or three Agency officers at any time were cleared for access to
Fort Detrick activities. (Senate hearings, pg 6). Frank Olson was one
of these. But because of the compartmentalization it is unlikely that
Frank Olson had much idea of what took place at Detrick beyond his work
bench until he was promoted to be acting chief of the Special Operations
Division. Even then he would have no knowledge of what happened to the
products of Detrick when they left the encampment and he certainly had
no idea that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had an offensive, first use policy
for biological weapons applicable to the Korean War then in progress.
He was working as a pure research scientist, solving technical problems
surrounding the cultivation and spread of bacteria.
In
late February and early March 1953 something happened which would have
raised the profile of the Korean War sharply in Frank Olson’s mind.
Two high ranking officers of the United States Marine Corps, who had
been taken prisoner by the Chinese army in Korea, made lengthy, detailed
confessions about the U. S. military forces using biological weapons
in Korea and China. The Chinese broadcast their statements around the
world. A glance at The New York Times Index for 1953 (pg 573)
under the heading “Germ Warfare” shows the large number of
articles on the subject day after day, and charges about the use of
biological warfare as a crime against humanity.
Even
though U. S. officials denied the Chinese claims, Frank Olson would
have faced the stark possibility that his work was no longer “pure
research.” It was at this time that his feelings of guilt arose,
and according to his wife, he began to have sleepless nights.
How would the CIA cope with a man who is beginning to have doubts and who is in a position to reveal the most secret of its secrets?
In
his early years at the biological warfare laboratory, during World War
II, one of Frank Olson's close colleagues there had been Dr. HAROLD
ABRAMSON who was a specialist in immunology and allergies and who initiated
the breakthrough therapy of penicillin aerosol for infected lungs. More
recently his colleagues at the laboratory included DR. SID GOTTLEIB,
who was chief of the Technical Services Division, and ROBERT V. LASHBROOK,
Ph.D, who joined the organization only in 1952. Olson, Lashbrook and
possibly Gottlieb were also members of the CIA group at Detrick. The
chief of the Special Operations Division was VINCENT L. RUWET, a Lt.
Colonel in the Chemical Corps and a man who described himself as a close
personal friend of the Olson family. These men interacted with, one
might say surrounded, Frank Olson in his last days before he either
committed suicide, or as some suspect, was murdered.
In the autumn of 1953 Olson's psychological state of mind worsened. This worsening coincided with considerable publicity in the press about the return to the United States of twenty-five airmen who had made confessions of using biological warfare in Korea. U. S. authorities claimed that the Chinese had “brainwashed” their prisoners, cleaned out their minds and inserted the false information. It was an absurd idea, a caricature of how the Chinese had induced their prisoners to write elaborate confessions, nevertheless, there was much discussion of the question at the United Nations and in the newspapers. (See New York Times Index, ibid.)
Meanwhile
the CIA had become interested in the possibilities of “brainwashing.”
Proof of this, which came to light many years later, was the contract
it made with a Canadian psychiatrist in Montreal, Dr Ewen Cameron, to
experiment illegally on his patients with LSD and possibly other drugs
for such purposes.
One
way, therefore, for the Agency to deal with its troubled member at Fort
Detrick would be to have him forget all he knew about Special Operations,
to clear out his mind by this supposed new technique of “brainwashing.”
Then he could safely be allowed to retire from the service and return
with his family to his home town in Wisconsin. Frank Olson himself believed
“that the CIA group had been putting something like Benzedrine
in his coffee at night to keep him awake.” (Colby Pg 37-38)
The
Colby documents reveal that “an experiment” was tried on Olson,
involving the use of some drug. The experiment appears to have been
conducted with Olson's consent and took place on Thursday, 19th November
1953. The experiment failed to work as intended. It did not clear his
mind; it worsened his anxieties and nine days later Frank Olson was
dead, having jumped or been pushed through a window on the tenth floor
of the Statler Hotel in New York City.
Reporting on Frank Olson’s death in the Colby Papers proceeds on three levels.
At
the first level there are the reports of the New York city policeman
who came to the scene after a call from the Statler Hotel around 4 a.m.
on 28th November as well as comments by two New York city detectives.
These officers conclude that it was a case of suicide, although they
toy with the idea that it might be a homicide because Robert Lashbrook
had stayed in the same hotel room as Olson and because of his reluctance
to answer certain questions.
At
the second level are the reports of two Special Agents sent to question
Lashbrook in New York City.
At
the third level are memoranda by Dr. Howard Abramson and Lt. Colonel
Vincent Ruwet giving their understandings about Frank Olson and About
what happened in the last few days of his life.
The
most striking information is that contained in the report of the two
Special Agents who are identified only as “reporting agent for
Case No 73317,” and “Walter P. T.,” which centres on
the activities of Robert Lashbrook. The agency controlling these two
agents is not identified in the documents. Are they also CIA? Or Department
of Defense? The two agents, who did not seem to have any prior knowledge
about Lashbrook (CIA agent) or his work unit, interviewed him intensively
and followed him around all day following Olson's death.
What
follows are my comments on some ambiguities, coincidences and question
marks that arise from the report of the two special agents on the death
of Frank Olson:
1.
Lashbrook said that Olson had jumped through the window shade and the
window glass. What kind of window shade was it? Was it broken? If the
window shade was Venetian blinds it would have been a virtually impossible
scenario. Could it be that the window shade was lowered after the man
went through the window?
2.
The first call that Lashbrook made was not to the hotel management or
the police, but to his superior, Dr. Sid Gottlieb, at his home in Virginia,
to tell him what had happened. Then he reported to the hotel desk clerk
and telephoned Dr. Abramson. He did not call Lt-Col Ruwet, the chief
of the Special Operations Division, right away. Ruwet was a close friend
of the Olson family, he had been in contact with Olson daily since June
1953 and had been with Lashbrook and Olson in New York until the previous
day. Was there any significance to the sequence of these calls? [Gottlieb
is mentioned by Colby in his testimony to the Senate Committee in September
1975, pg 22-23 as the person who destroyed CIA records on BW activities.]
3.
Lashbrook told the police that Olson had come to New York on 24th November
to seek help for mental illness. In view of Olson’s upset state
of mind that was not unreasonable. But why had Olson been taken to see
Dr Abramson who was not a psychiatrist at all but a skin allergist?
Was it because Olson was suffering from some embarrassing aftermath
of the drug ‘experiment’ of 19th November as well as from
nervous disorder? Was it because Abramson, an old acquaintance of Olson's
in the Chemical Corps, could handle the situation without publicity?
Lashbrook had also given Lt-Col Ruwet the impression that Olson was
coming to New York to see a psychiatrist. (Colby, p. 46)
4.
When Olson died there were no papers to identify him. Reportedly he
himself had thrown away his papers, his identification badge and his
wallet while walking around the city the previous day. As a result when
reporters came to the police station they could get no information about
the dead man's identity and the story never hit the New York papers.
This coincidence was extremely convenient for Lashbrook, the Chemical
Corps and the CIA.
5.
Lashbrook shared an apartment in Washington, D. C. with EDWIN SPOEHEL.
Who was Edwin Spoehel?
6.
The Reporting Agent notes that other than exhibiting fatigue, Lashbrook
“appeared completely composed” throughout 28th November, the
day Olson died. Robert Lashbrook must have been a hard-boiled type,
nerves of steel.
7.
Sid Gottlieb instructed Lashbrook to get a report from Dr. Abramson
on Olson and bring it back to Washington with him. Lashbrook and special
agent Walter P. T. Jr. went together to Abramson's office at 9:15 in
the evening of the 28th. Lashbrook asked agent Walter P. T. to remain
in the reception room while he spoke to Dr. Abramson. While waiting
in the outer office agent Walter P. T. was nevertheless able to overhear
the conversation of the two men, which he records in his report. What
transpired between Lashbrook and Abramson?
It
seems that the CIA wanted to make sure certain things were in a report
that might become the basis of a claim to the Bureau of Employees Compensation.
[ From reading Dr. Abramson's report it is not readily evident what
the CIA wanted in particular to have in it.] C. Lashbrook and Abramson
adjourned their discussion and moved into another room apparently relaxing
with a drink. Agent Walter P. T. heard Abramson remark to Lashbrook
that he “was worried as to whether or not the deal was in jeopardy”
and he thought “the operation was dangerous and the whole deal
should be reanalyzed.” What was the “deal” which both
Dr. Abramson and CIA Agent Lashbrook knew about?
What
“operation” was dangerous? Was this conversation still relating
to the Olson case? After all these years there may be no possibility
of following up to find answers to these elusive and sometimes disturbing
questions. Without knowing something more about them, especially about
the shadowy figure of Robert Lashbrook, it would be difficult to determine
with greater certainty how Frank Olson met his death. I hope that my
speculations, and they are nothing more than that, may be of some interest
and modest help to you.
Sincerely,
Stephen
Endicott
June 6, 2001:
Dear Steve and
Ned,
After studying your remarkable book more carefully it occurs to me to
ask you about one of the most mysterious details in the documents I
received from William Colby in 1975. I wonder if this will mean anything
to you.
I refer to a two-page document entitled:
“MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD” SUBJECT: Project ARTICHOKE
The memorandum is dated 3 February 1975.
Both pages of the document are totally whited-out with the exception
of a paragraph near the bottom of the second page. This reads as follows:
7. Little information pertaining to the suicide of Frank OLSON was found
in the collection of materials made available by DDS&T. However,
one brief memorandum dated 14 December 1953 mentioned the OLSON incident.
The memorandum stated in part “LOVELL reported that QUARLES and
George MERCK were about to kill the Schwab activity at Detrick as “un-American.”
The memorandum later continued "LOVELL knew of Frank R. OLSON.”
Dr. John Schwab, whom I knew, was the founder and first director of
Special Operations at Detrick.
I wonder what other light you might be able to shed on this, particularly
on what “the Schwab activity” might refer to.
The other thing that has occurred to me on re-reading your book and
considering the role of the CIA in BW in Korea is the very likely possibility
that my father was the CIA’s man at Detrick, whose job may well
have been that of linking Detrick's resources with the CIA's task of
administering the secret deployment of BW in cooperation with the Air
Force. This impression is strengthened by information we now have that
proves that the purpose of Presidential “apology” our family
received in 1975 was to deflect our intention to sue, which might have
led to our discovering the true nature of my father's job. It was not
only the cover-up of his “bizarre death” (as this information
refers to it) that was in question, but the nature of his work.
Best regards, -
Eric
June 7, 2001
Dear Eric,
The meaning of
“Schwab activity” is not apparent from the documents you have.
I have a speculation about it though. It is related to that part of
Special Operations which was said to be was one of Gottleib’s specialities:
creating means (darts, toxins etc.) to assassinate particular individuals.
I suppose that to people like George Merck this might seem to be an
“un-American” activity. Merck, as you know, was one of the
strongest promoters of the idea of using biological weapons in war,
therefore he obviously wouldn’t have considered BW as such to be
“un-American.” But individual acts of terror might have been
in a different, troubling category in their minds. It’s just a
thought.
I was reading your website yesterday and was quite amazed to find out
about the circumstances of Colby's death on the eve of being called
up to testify before a Grand Jury! Did that Grand Jury meet and mark
recommendations about investigating your father's death?
Best, Steve
The
United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War
and Korea.
